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Redefining Puerto Rico's Political Status 
Pedro Caoon* 
Almost four decades after the U.S. government announced to the 
United Nations that Puerto Rico had ceased to be a colony, Congress 
reconsidered the country's political status. In 1989, the lOlst Congress 
initiated a legislative process that was designed to produce a bill to authorize 
a referendum on the political status of Puerto Rico. Although status-related 
legislative activity continued into the 102nd Congress, no bill was ever 
drafted. The House and Senate draft bills would have called on the people 
of Puerto Rico to express their preference for one of three options: 1) 
independence, 2) annexation into the Union as the 51st state, or 3) redefini­
tion of the current Commonwealth arrangement. The most significant feature 
of the proposed legislation was explicit language calling for the implemen­
tation of the preferred option. 
Although Puerto Rico's political-juridical status has been the subject of 
congressional scrutiny and debate since as far back as 1898, the current 
referendum process is unique because it is the fll'St time since 1917 that 
Congress has taken a lead in defining the nature of Puerto Rico's status. 
Congressional interest in reworking the colonial formula appears at a partic­
ularly dynamic period in world histoxy. Seemingly unrelated geopolitical and 
international economic developments bear directly on the issue of Puerto 
Rico's probable decolonization1 and suggest answers to why the U.S. gov­
ernment has finally decided to revisit the colonial question. 
• I would like to thank Angelo Falc6n, Edgardo Mel&xlez, Jose Sanchez, and Rosalie 
Mornles Keams for their comments. This is an expanded and updated version of "Reworking 
the Colonial Formula: Puerto Rico into the Twenty-F11'5t Century," which appeared in Radical 
America 23, no. 1 Qan.-Feb. 1989):9-20. 
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U.S. colonial policy toward Puerto Rico has historically been propelled 
by two considerations: utilizing Puerto Rico's strategic location in a region of 
aitical geopolitical significance, and securing a favorable investment climate 
for U.S. business. Since the end of World War II, Puerto Rico has been 
promoted as a bulwark against the spread of communism in the Caribbean, 
and its shores have been used as a base for U.S. militaxy intervention in the 
region. This perception has gradually changed, however, with the end of the 
Cold War, the reversals of socialist and social-democratic regimes in Central 
and Latin America, and widespread popular skepticism about the notion that 
communism breeds revolution in the region. 
Puerto Rico has been an extremely profitable base of operations for 
U.S. business.1hree periods have been particularly important in the counlly's 
twentieth-century economic growth, all characterized by export-oriented 
industries producing for the U.S. market: 1) a sugar-based economy under 
the control of absentee corporations, 2) U.S.-led labor-intensive manufactur­
�g in �pparel and t�e products, and 3) most recently, large-scale capital­
mtensJ.ve pharmaceutical and electronics firms and sophisticated financial 
and commu�cations services under the control of global enterprises. How­
ever, with the passing of each phase, the U.S. government has been com­
pell�d to �sume � ev�r larger role in sustaining Puerto Rico's economy, 
playmg an mcreasmgly unportant role in sustaining social welfare, govern­
ment operations, and industrial production. Moreover, given the nature of 
�e economic growth that is taking place, congressional aitics are question­
mg whether the prevailing relationship is still necessary to attract U.S. 
investments.2 
The current congressional debates on the future political status of 
Puerto Rico occur in the context of a less threatening geopolitical climate but 
� increasingly volatile international economic scene. Seldom explicitly 
discussed, but always on the minds of policy -makers, is whether the colony 
of Puerto Rico is still essential to preserve the geopolitical and economic 
interests of the United States. Complicating these discussions is the realizaton 
that Puerto Rico is plagued by a series of social, eco11-omic, and political 
maladies that will likely remain unattended under the prevailing political 
status. Clearly, events in Washington leave little doubt that the U.S. govern­
ment considers the prevailing relationship deficient and in need of serious 
revision. Accordingly, debates between Congress and the Executive Branch 
have been guided by two sets of concerns-whether decolonization will 
co�promise U.S. national security and undermine the profitability of U.S. 
busmess, and whether the prevailing status can be reworked into a more 
cost-efficient and politically manageable relationship. Crisis in colonial man-
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agement of Puerto Rico is not new. What is new is Congress's explicit 
commitment to resolve the vexing problem of Puerto Rico's political status. 
In this chapter, I discuss the relationship between Puerto Rico's Com­
monwealth status and economic growth in the post-war period. I examine 
the attempts by the PPD, or Partido Popular Democratico, repeated since 
the late 1940s, to gain more autonomous powers for the insular government 
and the declining relevance of the colonial relationship for U.S. business. I 
conclude with a review of the legislative process during the 101st Congress 
and examine the aitical issues that framed Congress's debates on the future 
of Puerto Rico. 
The Commonwealth and the economics of colonialism 
Puerto Rico's political status is defined by Public Law 600 (PL 6oO) and 
the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act it created. PL 600 went into effect on 
July 3, 1950, and authorized the government in Puerto Rico to draft a 
constitution and establish a republican form of government. The PPD, the 
party in power at the time, was a major force in bringing this project to fruition. 
The U.S. Senate Committee that wrote the legislation reasoned "that it 
is in line with the policy of the Government to provide, the largest possible 
measure of local self-government for people who are under the flag of the 
United States."3 'f!le legislation was widely promoted as a fundamental 
restructuring of the colonial relationship to permit Puerto Ricans to manage 
their domestic political economy. Yet the same committee emphasized that 
the new bill did not diminish the island's subordination to the federal 
government: "The measure would not change Puerto Rico's fundamental 
political, social, and economic relationship to the United States."4 
On March 3, 1952, 47 percent of registered voters in Puerto Rico 
approved a constitution. Approximately 20 p�rcent of the voters rejected that 
constitution, while independence forces boycotted the referendum. The 
"Commonwealth," known in Spanish as the ''Estado Libre Asociado" (EIA), 
was proclaimed on July 25, 1952, and presented to the world as a new 
political entity with autonomous powers over domestic affairs-ostensibly 
the end of colonialism for Puerto Rico. However, the U.S, grant of self-gov­
ernment was provisional, since " ... [C]onstitutionally, Congress may repeal 
Public Law 600, annul the Constitution of Puerto Rico and veto any insular 
legislation which it deems unwise or improper. From the perspective of 
constitutional law the compact between Puerto Rico and Congress may be 
unilaterally altered by the Congress."5 
While PL 600 was an important element of Puerto Rico's favorable 
in�estment climate, it did not affect economic regulations that were originally 
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set up in 1900 through the Foraker Act In fact, the essential measures that 
attracted U.S. investments in manufacturing and which locked the country's 
economy into· the metropolitan network of production and trade were in . 
place well before the establishment of the Commonwealth. Exemptions from 
federal taxation, a common monetary system, inclusion in the U.S. Customs 
area, provisions for the collection and return of excise taxes, access to U.S. 
financial markets, special treatment under federal tax laws, insular maritime 
legislation, partial exemption from the Fair Labor Standards Act, prohibitions 
against commercial treaties with foreign nations, direct federal transfers to 
individuals and the public bureaucracy, and application of Taft-Hartley 
legislation were on the books before 1952. The federal government retained 
control over monetary and trade policy and kept the original Foraker Act 
provisions that authorized the colonial administration to establish a tax 
system. 
Nonetheless, PL 600 was significant because it created a set of social 
institutions and arrangements that enhanced the prospects for long-term 
corporate investments and profitability. In the process, it established a 
political and economic environment that accelerated Puerto Rico's integra­
tion into the U.S. economy as a low-wage manufacturing center. Although 
the structure of colonial rule was preserved, the colonial state was given the 
requisite autonomy to devise planning and social polides consistent with the 
requirements of a new and more advanced phase of capitalist development 
The creation of the ELA is best understood in the context of domestic 
and international politico-economic developments in the immediate post­
war era, when dominant political forces- in the colony, intent on preserving 
their hegemony, sought alliance with U.S. capital and metropolitan state 
interests.6 The national and international attention lavished on Puerto Rico 
coqverted that little-known and poveity-stricken country into the center of 
"freedom and power in the Caribbean. "7 
While th� ELA presetVed the structure of colonial rule, it also gave 
government officials in Puerto Rico the necessary autonomy and flexibility 
to promote a new model of accumulation. For potential investors, Puerto 
Rico loomed as a new tropical investment paradise, replete with political 
stability, low wages and a compliant government. Puerto Rico was an ideal 
investment site for these firms for two reasons. First, Puerto Rico was 
exempted from federal regulations over industrial labor relations, wage 
policy, environmental quality, and other areas·. Second, ELAretained the most 
economically attractive features of the colonial relationship-federal tax 
credits and exemption from taxation, duty-free access to U.S. markets, and 
monetary stability. In the immediate post-war period Puerto Rico virtually 
guaranteed U.S. business the highest profit rates in the hemisphere. 
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OnJanuruy 19, 1953, the United States unilaterally removed Puerto Rico 
from the United Nations list of non-self-governing tenitories, and obtained a 
permanent exemption from having to submit annual reports on the country's 
soda! and economic conditions to the Secretary General. Puerto Ricans, the 
United States told the world, had freely chosen through open democratic 
elections to retain their long-standing association with the United States. The 
nature of this compact of mutual association was, and continues to be, legally 
and politically obscure. However, the ELA was pronounced as being inter­
nally self-governing and sovereign over those matters not prohibited by the 
Constitution of the United States. The PPD joined U.S. policy-makers in a 
campaign to mystify the country's colonial status. The ELA was part of a 
strategy to mitigate international criticism of the United States as a colonial 
power and to authenticate the U.S. crusade for post-war global decoloniza­
tion. Since 1952, the United States has tried to convince an increasingly 
skeptical·global community that Puerto Rico is not a colony.8 
The PPD, under the leadership of Luis Mufi.oz Marin (its founder and 
first elected governor of Puerto Rico), was a major force behind this symbolic 
change in the colonial formula. Originally formed in the late 1930s as an 
anti-imperialist populist movement, the PPD readily dominated Puerto Rico's 
political scene for nearlythree decades: But by 1948, PPD offidals abandoned 
their goal of independence and called upon the people of Puerto Rico to 
support a program of economic integration into the United States through a 
refurbished colonial formula. The PPD's decision to abandon independence 
and intensify the country's subordination to the metropolitan economy was 
seen in some sectors as a betrayal, which many believe predpitated the 
nationalist uprisings of the 1950s. 
In the bipolar post-war world, conceived of by U.S. legislators in terms 
of preserving national security in the face of ?oviet expansion, there was little 
patience in Congress for an independent, conceivably social-democratic, 
regime in the Caribbean. The PPD leadership recognized this and consoli­
dated its emerging hegemony by legitimizing the objectives of a U.S. foreign 
policy that was predi�ted on suffocating national liberation struggles 
throughout the world. In their eyes, Puerto Rico stood as a shining example 
of tlie economic and sodal gains that could be achieved by the third world 
through dependent capitalist development, and political subordination to 
the United States. 
'Perfecting the Commonwealth' 
The redefined colonial relationship did not represent the culmination 
of the PPD's efforts to rework the terms of Puerto Rico's subordination. On 
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the contrary, it was the foundation upon which the PPD would pressure the 
federal govermnent for enhanced autonomy in order to "perfect" the Com­
monwealth relation. 
1hroughout the 1950s and 1960s, the PPD lobbied the federal govern­
ment in a failed effort to obtain increased decision-making powers, particu­
larly over those areas that affected economic performance. The PPD had two 
goals which, if successful, would have also prevented its most serious 
political opposition, the statehood movement, from emerging as a viable 
alternative: first, to sustain an internationally favorable investment climate for 
foreign capital; second, to fortify its own domestic political base. The gradual 
expansion of Puerto Rico's autonomous powers was seen by the PPD 
leadership as essential to achieve both goals. With increased decisional 
capadty over economic matters, Pllerto Rico would continue to respond to 
the needs of U.S. business and thus promote growth. Congressional approval 
for amendments to the Federal Relations Act would also enhance the 
standing of the PPD and convince the electorate that ELA was a permanent 
solution to Puerto Rico's uncertain political identity. With the necessary 
corre,ctives, the PPD seemed to argue, Puerto Rico would be spared from 
eventually having to choose between statehood and independence. 
Mufioz Marin developed a particular conception of the Estado Libre 
Asociadobased on the prindples of compact and consent between two equal 
peoples. According to a State Department study authored by Arthur Borg, 
Mufioz Marin argued 
In approving the law (PL 600) and submitting it to the Puerto 
Rican people, Congress was asking them to consent to its 
taking effect. If they gave it their approval, the argument ran, 
the result would be that the Puerto Rican constitution and the 
new Federal Relations Act would be legitimized by the con­
sent of the Puerto Rican people.9 
By 1959 MufiozMarin hadfurther developed the concept of"compact." 
He noted, "The idea of compact determines a basic change in the relation­
ship. It takes away from the very basis of the relationship the nature and onus 
of colonialism. It cannot be revoked or changed unilaterally. "10 dearly the 
problem with all of this was that the formulation was only in Mufioz Marin's 
mind, since Congress had not legislated away its constitutional powers over 
· tenitorial matters, and specifically over Puerto Rico. In passing PL 6oo, 
Congress was merely expanding the range of Puerto Rico's powers over local 
self-govermnent. 
On March 23, 1959, less than seven years after the proclamation ofELA, 
Puerto Rico's Resident Commissioner introduced legislation in Congress to 
alter and clarify PL 6oo.11 But the persistent congressional opposition to the 
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implidt claim of sovereignty contained in the bill forced the PPD to substitute 
a substantially revised bill in September 1959. The new measure was sub­
jected to intense congressional scrutiny, detailed studies by Executive Branch 
agendes, and wide-ranging debate in public hearings .. The public hearings 
revealed the absence of consensus among Puerto Rico's political leadership 
on what type of changes should be effected in the colonial relationship. The 
U.S. govermnent also opposed any changes in legislation that restricted the 
constitutionally defined prerogatives of the federal govermnent to regulate 
Puerto Rican affairs. After two years of legislative activity, Congress failed to 
act on the measure, and it died quietly in early 1961. 
1hroughout the 1960s, Mufioz Marin pursued his intellectual and 
political campaign to lay the foundations for an expansion of EIA's autono­
mous powers. However, even he could not leverage his considerable 
international prestige and close personal ties with the Kennedy Administra­
tion to amend PL 600. But he was able to obtain White House approval for 
the establishment in 1964 of a U.S.-Puerto Rico Cormnission. The 
Commission's work led to one of the most comprehensive reports on Puerto 
Rico's status, and its members recommended holding a plebisdte. In 1967, 
amid deteriorating economic conditions, growing popular appeal for the 
statehood movement, and apparent U.S. impatience with lobbying for more 
autonomy, Munoz Marin called for a plebisdte. 
Unlike its predecessor in 1952, the 1967 referendum was not an 
initiative by Congress, and thus ha&no legal force to affect relations.12 The 
PPD antidpated oveiWhelming popular support for the Commonwealth 
proposal, which would give it "the authorization to develop the Estado Libre 
Asociado ... to the maximum level of self-govermnent. "13 Moreover, the PPD 
hoped the plebisdte results would solidify its electoral standing and ulti­
mately convince Congress to grant the Commonwealth autonomous powers 
over critical areas of the political economy. The 1967 plebisdte failed to 
accomplish any of this; in fact, it intensified the divisions within the PPD, led 
to the emergence of a younger and more sophisticated leadership in the 
statehood movement (Partido Nuevo Progresista, or PNP), and contributed 
to the PPD's electoral defeat in 1968. 
In 1973 the PPD returned to office, and once again attempted to 
resurrect its cherished dreams for "perfecting " the Commonwealth. Mufioz 
Marin obtained presidential approval for a spedal commission to study 
U.S.-Puerto Rican relations. That Commission's report was released in Octo­
ber 1975 as the "Compact of Permanent Union" and recommet1Ped a 
thorough restructuring of the colonial relationship. It called for granting 
Puerto Rico the right to partidpate in international organizations, jurisdiction 
over territory held by the United States, control over tariff and immigration 
Redef:Lnlng Puerto Rico's Pol itical Status 
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policy, the right to enter into commercial treaties, exemption from the Federal 
Fair Labor Standards Act, authority to regulate environmental quality stan­
dards, and other recommendations for increased autonomy. 
The report left no doubt that the Commonwealth status deprived the 
insular administration of the miniinal policy tools needed to regulate Puerto 
Rico's political economy. If the colonial formula were not reworked, the 
report seemed to argue, Puerto Rico would relinquish its status as a center 
for capital accumulation. The Compact was a plea by the PPD to the U.S. 
government to grant the Commonwealth the flexibility it needed to respond 
to the changing requirements of an emerging new economic order. 
What the PPD feared most was that economic deterioration would 
thwart its aspirations for re-establishing its political hegemony after its defeat 
in the 1968 elections. But the Compact was not only linked to a new model 
of capital accumulation and political dotl)inance, it also required a drastic 
reduction in U.S. authority over its possession-something the federal gov­
ernment rejected then and continues to resist. 
During its four years in office (1973-1976), the PPD Administration led 
,by Rafael Hernandez Col6n did not embark on a campaign to alter the status 
of the island. Possibly lulled into thirrking that the PPD's loss to the statehood 
party in 1968 was an aberration, Hernandez Col6n did not view the PNP as 
a serious electoral threat. Although he set about to reintegrate disaffected 
sectors of the traditional PPD coalition, his administration was forced to 
contend with Puerto Rico's most serious recession since the post-war era. In 
an.effort to counter the downturn, Hemandez Col6n imposed harsh eco­
nomic measures, with the result that the PPD began to undermine its electoral 
base. The PPD's inability to extricate the economy from the recession, along 
with its unpopular austerity programs, set the stage for a victory by the PNP 
in 1976. However, the elections of 1976 also proved the existence of 
widespread underlying popular support for the statehood party, and thus 
reinvigorated the dormant status issue. 
After its sobering defeat, PPD strategists re-evaluated the party's elec­
toral strategy in the context of a campaign to enhance the autonomous 
powers of the Commonwealth. In 1978, the PPD introduced La Nueva Tesis. 
its vision of a new federal relationship for Puerto Rico. Rafael Hernande� 
Colon wrote �t in order to confront the changing economic and social 
demands of the 1980s, Puerto Rico required much greater "political authority 
over its own life." He called for a number of changes in PL 600, including 
increased insular control over labor-management relations, salaries and "all 
the conditions of employment in our economy. "14 La Nueva Tesiswas closely 
patterned on the recommendations of the Compact of Permanent Union. 
However, it contained a withering attack against statehood, arguing that the 
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resulting loss of tax benefits and increased reliance on federal support would 
create dependency and lead to the destruction of Puerto Rico's nascent 
middle class. 15 
The PPD was prepared to reactivate the status issue and to make it a 
focal point of the 1980 elections. For the first time some of its leaders testified 
before the United Nations Decolonization Committee and met with repre­
sentatives of the Cuban delegation that had submitted a resolution supporting 
Puerto Rico's right to self-determination. During the 1980 campaign the PPD 
came under bitter criticism for its supposed alliance with the Cubans. This 
collusion with the presumed enemy of Puerto Rico may have been decisive 
in PPD's subsequent defeat.16 
Romero Barcel6, the incumbent governor, campaigned in part on the 
premise that if re-elected he would call for a referendum on Puerto Rico's 
status in 1981. Both parties were staking their electoral futures on the belief 
that the elections would finally determine Puerto Rico's status preference. 
Yet the election results were indecisive. Although Romero Barcel6 was 
elected governor, his margin of victory was the smallest in any of Puerto 
Rico's general elections.17 With such a miniscule mandate, the PNP feared 
possible rejection of the statehood option if a referendum was held. Not 
surprisingly, Romero Barcel6 did not promote a status change during his 
tenure. However, his administration was characterized by a bitter ideological 
campaign against those sectors of society promoting autonomy and inde­
pendence.18 Independence, socialist, and nationalisrforces in Puerto Rico 
were readily labelled terroristic, and Romero's administration worked assid­
uously to create the myth that they were closely allied to Cuba. The PPD 
came under attack and its leadership was portrayed as suspect because of its 
activities in the United Nations. Since the end of World War ll, Puerto Rico's 
political leadership has effectively promoted fears of communist subversion 
and Cuban intervention as a means to discredit independence forces. How­
ever, what was striking 3:bout the Romero period was its virulence against 
this sector, and its ideological affinity with the Reagan era. Combatting 
communism in Puerto Rico was, for the PNP, the equivalent of the Reagan 
Administration's policy of confrontation with the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and 
El Salvador's FDR-FMLN. 
Section 936 and the 'new colonialism' 
The post-World War II industrialization policy, known as Operation 
Bootstrap, succeeded in large part because it guaranteed that Puerto Rico 
would be a more profitable site than competing regional manufacturing 
centers in the United States. Until the mid-1960s, this policy responded well 
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to the needs of U.S. capital, which was ovetwhehningly labor-intensive and 
had relatively low capital requirements. Moreover, since these fnms imported 
raw materials and semi-processed commodities from the United States and 
re-eXported their finished products to metropolitan markets, the Puerto Rican 
ee'onorny fo�ed P:rrt of the U.S .. network of commodity production, trade, and money arculation. Puerto Rico was merely an extension of the metro­
politan economy. 
However, by the mid-1970s, the traditional structure of production was 
undergoing profound disruption. Policy-makers learned to their dismay that 
Puerto Rico was no longer competing solely with decaying regions in the 
mainland, but with the newly industrializing economies. As a result, the 
traditional fnms, which were losing their competitive advantage, evacuated 
Puerto Rico with alarming frequency. 
Faced with a profound crisis in investor confidence and economic 
deterioration, planning strategy was altered in response to the investment 
needs of newer industries. These industries were concentrated in pharma­
ceutiCals, electronics, and specialized medical equipment industries, and 
were ovetwhelmingly subsidiaries of multinational corporations. The goal 
of recreating a more favorable investment climate was behind Hernandez 
Colon's decision in 1974 to form the Committee to Study Puerto Rico's 
Finances. In 1975, the Committee presented its sobering analysis of the local 
econ�my.19.Its recommendations presaged the Reagan Administration's sup­ply-s1de philosophy. It called for eliminating those regulations that impeded 
corporate profitability and for reduced public-sector financing of basic social 
serVices. While the Committee endorsed the orthodox palliative that vibrant 
economic growth would increase the aggregate social wage and lead to an 
overall material improvement 'Of society, it argued that Puerto Rico lacked 
.many of the policy instruments it needed in order to control the activities of 
m�lti�ational firms. 31 Moreover, its policy recommendations were an explicit 
re,ectton of the more balanced growth and socially responsible perspective 
of the PPD's La Nueva Tesis. 
.� �e late 1970s, capital-rich, highly mobile, and technologically sophisticated firms were moving their operations in large numbers to Puerto 
Rico. They did so to utilize the skilled yet cheap labor, and to take advantage 
of new industrial incentives. But they were also induced to invest in Puerto 
Rico by generous federal tax credits. In 1976, Congress amended the tax 
exemption policy for U.S. firms with branches in Puerto Rico. The revised 
tax code, known as Section 936 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, permits 
U.S. subsidiaries in Puerto Rico to repatriate profits to the United States and 
rec�e a federal tax credit. Under the previous law, firms were taxed if they 
remtted accumulated profits while they continued to conduct business in 
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Puerto Rico. Thus, the old system provided an incentive for fnms to liquidate 
their operations at the expiration of the tax exemption period and to transfer 
their accumulated profits to the booming and lucrative Eurodollar markets. 
Ostensibly Congress enacted Section 936 to halt these ab�s. 
The impact of the new tax regime on the economy was dramatic. 
Multinational fnms in the pharmaceuticals, electronics, and precision instru­
ments sector migrated in even larger numbers to the island. These 936 
corporations transformed not only Puerto Rico's manufacturing sector, but 
its financial sector as well. By granting tax exemption on certain types of 
earned interest deposited in domestic financial markets, Congress encour­
aged the 936 corporations to retain their assets in Puerto Rico. In essence, 
Congress created a complementary fund market to provide low-cost capital 
for investment purposes. 
When combined with generous industrial incentives and subsidies, 
including fiscal inducements, tax exemptions, and low wages, Section 936 
converted Puerto Rico into an incredibly profitable investment site for 
international conglomerates. In 1988, U.S. firms in Puerto Rico realized profits 
of $8.9 billion, or about 19.7 percent of their declared global profits attribut­
able to direct foreign investment activity.21 In the process, Puerto Rico's 
economy became excessively reliant on Section 936 corporations. Rather 
than repatriating to the United States those profits that were eligible for tax 
credits and where the net return on investments was not as great as in offshore 
banking sites, 936 corporations began to deposit their surplus profits in 
Puerto Rican banks. By 1983, 41 percent of total commercial bank deposits 
were attributable to these fnms and approximately one-third of the labor 
force was either directly or indirectly dependent on these 936 corporations 
for employment.22 As a direct outgrowth of936, Puerto Rico was increasingly 
shifting its structure of capital accumulation from manufacturing to financial 
services. One student of this process notes: 
The financial income of export manufacturing 936 corpora­
tions became the fuel of the whole system. �illions of dollars 
in global profits were transferred to or declared in export 
manufacturing operations in Puerto Rico through a highly 
complex and sophisticated international financial network. 23 
The federal government is acutely aware of how important the Section 
936 tax credit is to employment and investment in the island, and knows that 
"a phase-out of Section 936 would cause economic dislocation in Puerto 
Rico."24 Nonetheless, in its annual reports on the "possessions corporation 
system of taxation," the Treasury Department argues that Section 936 is a 
giveaway for the multinational corporations that results in billions of dollars 
in lost revenue for the federal government. Since 1976, the Treasury has 
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periodically tried so-persuade Congress to rescind the credit as a way of 
reducing the federal deficit. Only because of a monumental lobbying effort 
by the ppr)> its congressional allies and the Puerto Rico-U.SA Foundation.25 
ps'the Tre�ry's 1985 campaign to abolish the credit defeated. But the 
Treasury, with its revenue-enhancing allies in Congress, has enacted mea­
sures that have offset the tax benefits of Secti6n 936. 
The implications of this squabbling are theoretically significant. The 
federal government and U.S. fums are clearly divided as to the benefits and 
cost!> of sustaining Puerto Rico as a colony. Certain developments indicate 
the growing influence of the fmance sector on the Puerto Rican economy. 
U.S. multinational banks and financial and investment firms have rapidly 
exp?flded their operations to Puerto Rico and are increasingly financing 
regional development projects. In addition, the insular government has 
enacted legislation to convert Puerto Rico into an offshore banking site. This 
sector of capital is less reliant on Section 936, cheap labor, and the economic 
benefits of colonialism than the multinational corporations now engaged in 
production. But periodic congressional review of Section 936 leaves little 
doubt that the enormous benefits acauing to the manufacturing-finance 
multinational corporations are also perceived as somehow detrimental to the 
fmancial well-being of the U.S. economy. 
Puerto Rico has become one of the most profitable assembly, packag­
ing, and testing platforms in the world for multinational firms and has evolved 
into an important offshore banking site as well. But this high-end economic 
growth has not mitigated the deplorable social and economic conditions that 
plague Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico's per capita income is less than one-third that 
of the United States ($5,157 in 1988, or about 47 percent of the per capita 
income of Mississippi,. the poorest state); unemplbyment unofficially strikes 
about 25 percent of the labor force; and labor participation rates are extremely 
low, about 41 percent 
According to a recent U.S. government report, "Chronic high poverty 
rates persist in Puerto Rico."26 In 1979, nearly two-thirds of Puerto Rico's 
population earned incomes below the federal poverty level. Puerto Rico is 
"' acutely dependent upon the federal government to sustain consumption and 
the operations of the government In 1988 federal �ers to Puerto Rico 
reached almost $6 billion, which accounted for 21 percent of the island's 
personal income and31 percent of the Commonwealth government's annual 
receipts. Illiteracy afflicts 11 percent of the population, af!d thus shatters the 
prospects for much of the population to participate in the more sophisticated, 
evolving economy. The Commonwealth spends only $1,40Qper studentQess 
than any U.S. state). Because of entrenched unemployment, out-migration 
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has once again increased and was estimated at 280,000 from 1980 to 1988 
(about 8.5 percent of the population). 
It is against this backdrop of contradictory development outcomes that 
the current status debate has to be understood. In reality, the U.S. government 
has kept the colony economically afloat and politically stable. While it 
developed fiscal tools to promote accumulation, it has had to allocate ever 
larger amounts of public capital to sustain the material and social reproduc­
tion of the colony. Given the nature of late capitalist expansion, which is 
highly mobile and extremely sensitive to changes in factor costs, this federal 
inteiVention to sustain minimal social standards is not surprising. 
Puerto Rico's internationalized economy virtually precludes the Com­
monwealth government from enacting socially responsible policies without 
jeopardizing the investment climate. The combination of federal incentives 
and Puerto Rico's giveaways to the multinationals sustains moderate ec<1-
nomic growth. This tenuous economic feature of the island's current rela­
tionship vis-a-vis the United States has been skillfully exploited by the 
statehood and independence activists. The colonial model is in crisis and it 
is they, we are told, who offer a feasible way out of the dilemma. 
The Senate and House bills 
In the ensuing 22 years since the last plebiscite, status-related activity 
has been uneventful and largely unnoticed by the public. Status bills were 
routinely introduced in Congress, and invariably died inconspicuously in 
various corrupittees. From 1976 to 1983, the pro-statehood PNP controlled 
the insular government, but lacked a sufficient electoral mandate to risk 
calling for a referendum on status. When the PPD returned to power in 1984, 
it did so with a slim margin of victory and with a U.S. president who ha,d 
endorsed statehood. The time, it seemed, was rtot propitious for resurreqing 
the status issue. 
Until now, Congress has avoided tinkering with the colonial formula. 
In part, this is because a more competitive political party system has evolved 
in Puerto Rico, which Congress has chosen to interpret as indecisiveness 
among Puerto Ricans about their preferred status. However, since neither the 
PNP nor the PPD commanded ovelWhelming electoral support, they didn't 
push the status issue. Instead, each party attempted to extract more funds 
from the federal government in order to expand its political bas� before 
calling for a referendum. 
But the most compelling reason for the U.S. government's inaction up 
to the present is that a status change opens a virtual Paqd?ra's box of tough 
policy issues. Puerto Rico has been a boon to U.S. firms and has been a key 
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com�onent of ?·�· nati�nal security strategy. However, federal budgetary 
defiats, endeffilc meffiaency and corruption by the insular administration 
entrenched poverty, the internationalized nature of Puerto Rico's dependen� 
economy, continued international criticism of the United States for its colonial 
policy, and numerous other factors encoura_ged Washington to revisit the 
colonial question. 
The federal government is intensely preoccupied with how each of the 
status �ptions affects its geO-political objectives, federal financing, investment 
�tra�eg1es, an� social conditions on the island. While the colony undoubtedly 
�still a luc:attve venture for certain sectors of U.S. capital and is presumably 
Vltal to national defense, it is also a drain cin the U.S. Treasury. Puerto Rico's 
dependence and economic growth shape the contours of its political elites' 
appeals to the electorate. But each political party also wants to allay the u.s. 
gov�ent's fears about growing budgetary deficits and about jeopardizing 
�ti�nal security. The referendum debate has been shaped by these conflict­
mg mterests and uncertain projections. 
In contrast to almost two decades of inconsequential status activity, 
1991 saw� flurry of action, culminating in two bills. The Senate Committee 
on Energy and Natural Resources approved Senate Bill 712 by a narrow 
margin of 11 to 8, which indicated substantial skepticism-among the senators 
about the merits of the legislation. '1:1 The bill, however, was not reported out 
of the Agricultural Committee when the 101st Congress convened. The 
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reported the Puerto Rico 
Self-Determination Act, HR 4765, favorably out of committee. Subsequently 
HR 4765 was approved by the full House'of Representatives. 
1bis most recent episode in the politics of status began in earnest when 
�
Senators Johnston and McClure of the Senate Committee on Energy and 
Na� Resources arrived in Puerto Rico on February 27, 1989. They came 
to �cuss draft legislation for a binding referendum on status witR the 
pres1�ents of the three political parties.28 Each party president agreed to 
subffilt status proposals to the Senate Committee. Three sets of public 
hearings were held during the summer of 1989 in Washington and SanJuan 
to refine and reconfigure the parties' status proposals. In November 1989 
the Se�te Finance Committee held hearings'in Wastungton to consider th� 
finanaal components of the legislation, and plarmed to draft a report in March 
1990. 
During the summer hearings, Committee Chairperson Senator John­
ston cautioned that the effectS of any status change would have to be 
revenu�neutral, meaning that a change in status could not entail federal 
expenditures beyond current levels. He noted that because of "the harsh 
fiscal reality facing Congress," it would "make budget 'neutrality' an objective 
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during its consideration" of the status options. It was Congress's intention, 
Johnston intoned, to respect the wishes of the people of Puerto Rico and to 
abide by the referendum results. Johnston also obsetved that while the 
United States respected international law as it related t6 self�etermination 
for the people of Puerto Rico, Congress would be ultimately guided by the 
Constitution of the United States and applicable Supreme Court rulings. 
Each party's proposal was scrutinized and challenged by the Senate 
Committee and the Bush Administration.29 Seventeen of the 20 proposals in 
the PPD project were rejected by the Committee. It rejected any changes in 
current law that entailed a reduction or constraint in the exercise of congres­
sional and Executive Branch powers over Puerto Rico. State Department 
r(:!presentative Mary V. Mochary argued that the enhanced Commonwealth 
proposal would create an unprecedented political status and" ... would grant 
to Puerto Rico significant attributes of sovereignty which would be incom­
patible with remaining part of the United States."" The State Department 
objected to delegating to Puerto Rico any authority vested in the Executive 
Branch by the Constitution. The PPD wanted assurances that Section 9.36 
would be retained indefinitely. However, Treasury Department official Ken­
neth W. Gideon instructed Congress that it "should make clear that tax 
benefits such as Section 936 cannot be regarded as benefits that will last 
indefinitely" but as incentives for investments subject to congressional revi­
sion.'' In short, the U.S. government rejected all PPD proposals designed to 
grant the Commonwealth limited autonomous powers. 
Administration officials reacted most favorably to the statehood pro­
posal, and repeatedly noted that statehood posed the least difficulty with 
respect to the issues of concern to the Executive Branch. Nonetheless, 
objections were raised over the use of Spanish in the U.S. District Court, tariffs 
on imported coffee, the 200-rnile jurisdiction of territorial waters and the 
provision for Congress to enact an omnibus bill that would "ensure that the 
people of Puerto Rico attain equal social and economic opportunities with 
the residents of the several states." Objection was also raised to-recognizing 
Spanish as the official language of Puerto Rico. These proposals were quietly 
dropped from the final versiop of the bill. While the PNP called for retaining 
Section 936, the bill provides for a five-year phasing-out period. 
Displaying solicitous and studious reflection, the Senate Committee 
entertained the proposals of the Partido Independentista Puertorri¢tefio 
(PIP). But despite its seemingly understanding demeanor, Washington offi­
cials rejected one of the party's key proposals. They were emphatic that the 
United States must retain a military presence in an "independent" Puerto Rico. 
Brigadier General M.J. Byron testified "the Department of Defense considers 
Puerto Rico as a strategic pivot point of major importance to U.S. national 
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security" and recommended retaining all current key military installations. 
Although he did not categorically reject the PIP's request for the United States 
to recognize "the right of the people of Puerto Rico to strive toward the total 
demilitarization of its territory," Byron cautioned that such a policy would 
involve degradation of U.S. military capabilities and impose enormous 
fmandal costs for the federal govemment.32 
More to the point, the State Department witness testified that "owing to 
the strategic importance of existing military installations and operations in 
Puerto Rico," the provision calling for the Republic of Puerto Rico to close its 
tenitory to any and all military forces of foreign nations was "directly at odds 
with U.S. global military interests-!'33 Given this resistance, the PIP was forced 
to recognize the legitimate security interests of the United States and said the 
issue of the military bases was negotiable. 
Because of Puerto Rico's excessive reliance on multinational corpora­
tions, the PIP called for a 25-year phasing-out period for Section 936. Senate 
Bill 712, however, terminates the tax credit upon the proclamation of 
independence and does not provide for alternative tax credits. Also rejected 
was the PIP proposal for unrestricted free trade between Puerto Rico and the 
United States. The Senate Coi'nmittee silnply approved a Joint Transition 
Commission to develop provisions for governing trade relations, and merely 
stated that Congress will consider negotiating mutual free-trade relations. The 
notion that Congress should compensate Puerto Rico for over 90 years of 
occupation was obviously anathema. The United States is willing to provide 
block grants for a period of nine years, the actual amount of_ which would 
be negotiated by the Commission, but it is estimated to be about $3.8 billion 
annually. 
Despite the PIP's inability to extract major economic concessions from 
the Senate, according to a congressional study Puerto Rico had a brighter 
economic future as an independent republic than a state. The Congressional 
Budget Office's report was the ftrst offidal U.S. government document that 
acknowledged the economic viability of independence, noting "an indepen­
dent Puerto Rico may be able to construct a set of incentives-through a 
combination of tax-sparing treaties and local subsidies-that would ap­
proach the attractiveness of current benefits under Section 936. "34 The study 
observed that "The potential loss of investment under statehood is large, both 
absolutely and compared with the fiscal benefits of ·statehood to Puerto 
Rico."35 
Throughout the legislative process Congress has rejected any role for 
the United Nations in monitoring the referendum process. Senator Johnston 
reasoned that, since the bill conforms to the PIP's proposal on the transfer of 
sovereignty and self-determination, the United States has complied with the 
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requirements of international law. Senators McClure andJohnstonfrequently 
instructed witnesses that Puerto Rico is not a Golony and emphasized that the 
resolution of Puerto Rico's status is strictly a domestic affair and not subject 
to United Nations mediation. Their views were strongly endorsed by the State 
Department, which claimed that Puerto Ricans had already exercised self­
determination in 1952 and 1967. 
The legislative process, as well as the substance of the bill, has been 
widely criticiZed as predpitous, inherently anti-democratic, and palpably 
colonial. Independence forces not affiliated with the PIP have repudiated 
Senate Bill712 as an explidt violation of the prindples of self-determination. 
Carlos Gallisa, president of the Partido Socialista Puertorriquefio (PSP), 
provided one of the most dramatic moments in the hearings when he 
challenged the very legitimacy of the referendum process. Gallisa called 
upon the Senate Committee to recognize that Puerto Rico is a colony and 
argued that, if it did not, "then nothing here will be resolved. And we will be 
repeating the useless exerdse of 1967 and the celebration of another sham 
election such as the previous one."36 He also called upon Congress to comply 
with United Nations Resolution 1514 (XV), the "Magna Carta ofDecoloniza­
tion." 
Nora Matias Rodriguez, president of the Colegio deAbogados de Puerto 
Rico, testified that Senate Bill 712 should be amended to provide for a 
constituent assembly that would draw up an alternate proposal that conforms 
to internationally accepted standards of self -determination. She called the 
provisions for unrestricted and perpetual access to the territory of Puerto Rico 
for military purposes a flagrant violation of these standards. 57 
The bill that came out of the Senate Committee contained a provision 
forniaking the results of the referendum binding on Congress and committed 
Congress to implementing the preferred solution (the self-executing provis­
ions of the bill). In addition, the bill contained explidt definitions of the three 
status options and the economic, political, and social obligations the federal 
governmentwould assume under statehood, independence, or an enhanced 
Commonwealth. 
The House bill 
The House Subcommittee on Insular and International Affairs also held 
hearings regarding the status of the island in Washington, in various dties in 
Puerto Rico, and in New York. Rather than subjecting each status option to 
the kind of rigorous ftseal analysis and political scrutiny conducted by the 
Senate, the House Subcommittee chose to defer discussions of these and 
other difficult issues until after the Puerto Rican people had expressed their 
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preferred option. The House favorably reported a bill out of committee that 
differed markedly from that of the Senate. House majority leader Thomas 
Foley and Morris Udall, chairman of the House Committee, had openly 
expressed their opposition to the self-execution provisions of the Senate bill. 
Puerto Rico's political parties tlireatened to boycott any referendum that 
failed to include a self-executing provision, claiming that without such a 
provision the referendum would be a mere beauty contest, totally at odds 
with the principles of self-determination. However, the parties grudgingly 
accepted a non-binding resolution after it became clear that the House would 
refuse to enact legislation that included self -execution. The House bill further 
differed in that it did not identify the status options. The electorate was 
expected to indicate its preference for one of the three options, or "none of 
the above." 
HR 4765 enumerated a three-stage process toward decolonization. The 
first step was a non-binding vot� preference contest Next, the two 
congressional committees would draft bills on the results of the referendum 
in consultation with Puerto Rico's parties and the President by March 6, 1992. 
Finally1 the bill provided that the legislation reported by the Joint Committee 
would become effective once the full Congress approved and in a second 
vote in Puerto Rico. The House bill also held out the option for further federal 
government action if the electorate rejected the bill in the second vote. 
By the end of October 1990, Puerto Rico's political parties were 
clamoring for a status referendum bill. While each saw problems with the 
House and Senate versions, the political leaders were committed to sustain­
ing the referendum process. Only the PPD became skittish about the 
referendum. Polls conducted by Puerto Rico's largest daily newspaper 
revealed the deteriorating strength of the Commonwealth forces. By early 
November 1990, only 34 percel).t of the electorate endorsed the Common­
wealth option, while 41 percent of those polled favored statehood.38 On 
November 17, the general leadership of the PPD in an extraordinruy meeting 
essentially voted not to participate in the proposed 1991 referendum unless 
Congress approved legislation by Februruy 3, 1991. Moreover, the PPD did 
the unthinkable by demanding that Puerto Rico be excluded from the 
territoriality clause of the U.S. Constitution, that any status legislation,must 
recognize the sovereignty of the Puerto Rican people. Given the Senate's 
long-standing and finn opposition to recognizing Puerto Rico's sovereignty, 
the PPD's decision to boycott the referendum halt contributed to the process. 
By demanding an explicit recognition ofPue�o Rico's sovereignty, the PPD 
was in reality postulating that itwanted to gain genuine autonomy for Puerto 
Rico. In the process, it.drew much closer to advocating independence than 
at any time since the late 1930s. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter began with a discussion of the nature of the c�lonial 
process and the economic and political factors that led to the establishment 
of the ELA as a redefined colony. Since 1952, Puerto Rico's economy has 
been evolving in such a way as to weaken the role the Commonwealth 
government plays in the capital accumulation process. The U.S. governm�t 
has histori�y resisted granting Puerto Rico increased powers to manage Its 
economy, instead enacting policies that encourage U.S. investments while 
providing direct "band-aid" support to sustain those major sectors of the 
population discarded by the process of distorted growth. 
. The legislative process associated with the passage of Senate Bill 712 
and House Bill 4765 has been a conspicuous exercise in imperial power. 
Congress has unilaterally decided that the proposed referendum conforms 
to standards of international law. 
Each of the three status proposals originally submitted by the political 
parties has been emasculated to conform to the U.S. government's �tional 
security concerns, and Congress's deliberations have been excessively influ­
enced by budgetary preoccupations. The Senate and House committees 
adopted very different strategies in devising their legislation. The Senate 
publicly aired its position with respect to the parties' proposals. The H�use, 
on the other hand, negotiated in private meetings and passed a relatively 
noncontroversial bill that deferred substantive discussions until the Puerto 
Rican people had advised Congress on their preference. 
The referendum process made clear that the U.S. government is search­
ing for a politically manageable and economical arrangement that � 
guarantee unrestricted military access to Puerto Rico and preserve the VItal 
economic interests of U.S. firms. In the process, the competing interests of 
different sectors of capital, the federal bureaucracy, Congress, and Puerto 
Rico's political leadership (whose participation is required to lend a sem­
blance of legitimacy to the process) hav<? all surfaced. This has hindered the 
negotiation process. 
The proceedings revealed that, while the prevailing colonial fonnula is 
unworkable, the U.S. government has no intention of revising the existing 
legislation to enhance the autonomous powers of the Commonwealth. Until 
now, the U.S. government has not been able to devise a formula that is 
satisfactory to all those who have a stake in the status issue. Unless the 
conflicting array of demands by political and economic forces is resolved, 
the U.S. may wind up keeping its hobbled colony at least to the end of the 
century. 
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Postscript 
In the 101st Congress, Senate Bill S712 and House Bill HR4765 were 
reported out of the respective committees. HR4765 was approved in a floor 
vote by the full House, but S712 was not reported out of committee before 
the 101st Congress adjourned. When the 102nd Congress convened, the 
House Committee introduced its original bill (retitled HR 244); the Senate 
Energy and Natural Resources Committee proposed an amended bill (S 244) 
that excluded some controversial provisions of the original measure. But the 
bill died in committee when proponents for the measure failed to obtain a 
majority. 
The status referendum process revealed a lack of consensus within the 
federal government on whether to support congressional efforts to enact 
status-related legislation. Congress was deeply divided on how to conduct 
the referendum and how to implement the referendum results. Open resis­
tance emerged to any legislation that would have conferred on the Common­
wealth .autonomous powers in the areas on international commerce trade 
investment, employment, and international relations. 
' ' 
U.S. domestic political consideration, concerns about partisan recom­
position of the legislature, antagonism to antidpated ethnidracial demo­
graphic changes, and budgetary considerations all factored into the calculus 
that led to a rejection of the status referendum legislation. Surprisingly, 
however, the status hearings had revealed that neither the military nor the 
national security apparatus publicly perceived that an independent Puerto 
Rico would compromise U.S. geopolitical interests in the region. 
The institutionalization of a highly competitive two-party system, in 
which statehood proponents hold a slim majority over the advocates for 
Commonwealth, also presented Congress with a dilemma. Any decoloniza­
tion proposal had to address the reality that a sizeable portion of the U.S. 
citizens living in Puerto Rico preferred statehood. Both the statehood PNP 
and the CommonwealthPPD recognized the implications of this conundrum. 
The"PPD, seeking to convince the U.S. government that Puertd Ricans had 
an intense national cultural identity that would make annexation unaccept­
able to the U.S. population, enacted legislation that established Spanish as 
the official language of Puerto Rico, and sought public approval for changes 
in the Puerto Rican constitution that codified the sanctity and distinctiveness 
of Puerto Rican cultural identity. However, the PPD's campaign was repudi­
ated by the electorate, and fortified the position of the statehood forces. 
Nonetheless, the recomposition of the political party system generates 
a new dynamic in the colonial formula. For three decades, from 1940 through 
1968, Puerto Rico was essentially a one-party system. The statehood party 
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has attained virtual parity with the PPD, and has at its disposal the resources 
and technical expertise to generate support among key legislators in Wash­
ington. While the party may not overcome what Senator Moynihan called a 
nativist bias in the Senate, its presence makes any transformation qf the 
curr.ent status unlikely. Unless the U.S. government is willing .to provide the 
type of gu�rantees the independence party proposes for the Republic of 
Puerto Rico, support for the statehood option will probably remain stable. 
As long as the electoral basis of statehood remains strong, the prospects for 
independence are nil. 
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